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NOTES

THE COURT OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
By
M. A. CARRINGER*
I ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

For convenience in considering the possible reform of the minor judiciary system in Pennsylvania, the subject may be divided into three parts:
(a) Organization;
(b) forms of procedure; and
(c) jurisdiction.
A considerable share of the maladjustment in the system now becoming
manifest is found in the organization of the court of the justice of the peace. The
rapid changes taking place in the social system and the increasing complexity of
modern life have created a situation which, in some degree at least, justifies the
charge frequently made that the system is archaic.
It is hardly surprising that the minor judiciary system has become somewhat
out of date. The office of justice of the peace comes down to us from the England of
the time of William Penn and its then existing character and functions were more
or less taken for granted. It was so much a part of the legal system which was
being taken over by the colonists that it did not occur to anyone that it might
be revised and reduced to a somewhat more systematic form. As some unforseen
situation presented itself, isolated acts were passed to take care of the particular
need. Some of the prevailing ideas relating to the justice of the peace were embodied
in the constitution, when, as to these particulars, the system became rigid. The
system today remains basically what it was in the first half of the nineteenth century. The social system, on the other hand, never stands still; it is always in a state
of flux; the process of change is unceasing. In this century the process of change has
been greatly accelerated. The world revolution, the outward beginnings of which
can be fixed as the outbreak of war in August 1914, has shaken society to its very
foundations. Our own society has become almost infinitely complex as compared
to the society of the early nineteenth century. Government must respond to these
changes. A vital government manifests itself in its ability to make the changes
necessary to adapt itself to the social conditions of the time. All the world over
the foundations of governmental institutions are being subjected to re-examination. The law of adaptation is an important law of life. All fields of the governmental process are subject to this law.
Since the office of justice of the peace is the foundation of the minor judiciary
system in Pennsylvania, this discussion will be directed particularly to that office.
The alderman performs the same functions under another name and, as new
* Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
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magistracies are constituted they are usually endowed with the powers of a justice of the peace.
While the forms of procedure need to be reduced to a consistent system
of rules, and while the jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the peace can be
improved by greater clarity of definition, a careful reorganization of the court
would remove the ground for much of the fault now being found with the system.
The maladjustments appear in the organization, rather than in the forms of procedure or in the jurisdiction. Much of the detail of the required reform is generally
agreed upon among students of this subject. An accumulating volume of reports
has been coming from bar associations, judicial councils and independent investigators of the minor judiciary system, with a wide variety of proposals for
reform. In order to apply the results of these inquiries to our own problems in
Pennsylvania, we must first examine the provisions of the constitution and the
statutes upon which the system is based. It will then be possible to suggest the
changes which will be necessary to bring about a form of organization which will
meet the social conditions prevailing in the latter half of the present century.
This will involve the extent of territorial jurisdiction, the qualifications of the
justice, the selection, term and compensation of the justice, possible divisions of the
court, physical equipment, clerical and executive assistants and finally the proper
status of the court. The factors to be considered in determining a suitable form of
organization are the function which the system is expected to perform and the
social conditions under which it must operate. We will consider these problems in
the order suggested.
A. Present Organization
(a) Constitutional requirements
Article V, sec. 1 of the constitution provides that "the judicial power of this
commonwealth shall be vested in. . . magistrates' courts, and in such other courts as
the General Assembly may from time to time establish." A reform of the system
would not make necessary any change in this article.
Article V, sec. 11, relates specifically to justices of the peace and aldermen.
It assumes the existence and functions of these officers. Its provisions are few. These
officers
"shall be elected in the several wards, districts, boroughs or townships, by the qualified electors thereof, at the municipal election, in such
manner as shall be directed by law, and shall be commissioned by the governor for a term of six years. No township, ward, district or borough
shall elect more than two justices of the peace or aldermen without the
consent of a majority of the qualified electors within such township,
ward or borough; no person shall be elected to such office unless he shall
have resided within the township, borough, ward or district for one year
next preceding his election. In cities containing over fifty thousand inhabitants, not more than one alderman shall be elected in each ward or district."
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It follows from this section:
(a) That the ward, borough or township is the district;
(b) that the officer is chosen by election by the qualified voters of
the district;
(c) that the officer is commissioned by the governor;
(d) that the term is six years;
(e) that the number is not more than two in each ward, borough
or township, except by consent of a majority of the electors of the district,
and, in cities over fifty thousand not more than one alderman in each
ward or district;
(f) that the only qualification is residence in the district for one
year.
(b) Statutes
A number of statutes, relating to election, bond, commission, term, location
of office, seal and compensation, have been enacted at various times from 1802 to
date. The principal act is that of June 21, 1839, P. L. 376.1 This act has been
variously amended and several supplements were enacted after the adoption of
the present constitution. Most of this legislation consists of short, unrelated acts.
The Act of 1839 itself is the only one indicating any study of the system as a whole.
In case a modern organization should become possible, these acts could be repealed or their substance worked into its proper place in the new organization.
In their present form they are somewhat disconnected fragments.
B. Suggested Reorganization
(a)

Extent of district

The ward, borough or township is not a satisfactory territory to be covered by
a justice of the peace under present conditions. In thinly settled rural districts,
one properly organized justice's court could serve several townships. At the other
extreme, in a thickly populated area, a ward may be too large a district. The volume of business does not depend upon the area of the district; density of population
is a much more important factor. The nature of the district, whether it is residential
or industrial, is also important in determining what area a justice's court can serve.
One justice's court to some determined unit of population would be more realistic
than the present provision. To determine a satisfactory unit will require some
research; it cannot be done arbitrarily. The number should not be fixed by the constitution. It must be subject to change as conditions require; it is impossible to foresee just what population the court can satisfactorily serve.
(b)

Qualifications

For a judicial officer upon whom falls heavy responsibilities and whose functions form an important segment of the judicial process, residence within the district for a period of one year, by itself could hardly be considered seriously as a
1 PA. STAT. ANN.

tit.

42,

§

1 (1930).
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qualification. The candidate for the office of justice of the peace should be of an
age insuring some experience with human affairs and some degree of maturity. He
should, above all, have some substantial education. If the office is made of sufficient
importance and placed on an adequate salary basis, the candidate might be required
to be a member of the bar of the court of common pleas in the county where his
district is located. An alternative would be a requirement for graduation from a
suitable school for magistrates established at the state university. Some provision
for continued legal education might be considered. In this field of continued
legal education for members of the minor judiciary, a splendid beginning has been
made by the minor judiciary school conducted by the Public Service Institute of
Pennsylvania. This movement has also developed the fact that many magistrates
are very much interested in such training. Activities of this kind will become much
more effective when the basic defects of the system are removed.
(c)

Selection, term, compensation

It is improbable, as a practical matter, that the method of election by the qualified voters of the district could be changed. It is possible that appointment by the
governor would insure more efficient officials; this may or may not be true; it is
very much an open question.
The term should be long enough to justify the candidate in preparing himself for the efficient performance of the duties of the office.The present term of
six years does not fully meet this requirement. Possibly a ten year term with eligibility for re-election would serve the purpose. If the justice is appointed, the term
might be during good behavior, as in the federal courts.
It is generally agreed that compensation of the justice of the peace should be
by fixed salary. Many of the abuses now prevalent find their basis in the fee system.
The justice is a judicial officer whose actions should not be influenced by whether
or not they result in a fee. The salary must be in correspondence with the qualifications and degree of efficiency required. It must be sufficient to lead men
properly qualified to make a career of this office.
(d)

Divisions of the court

Some states increase the flexibility of the justice's court by adding to it additional justices with special jurisdictions. The traffic court could be handled in this
manner. It would then serve all the purpose of the special traffic court and would
also fit into the minor judiciary system. The magistrate, dealing only with this
class of cases, has a chance to become an expert in this field. The so-called small
claims court would lend itself to the same treatment. This flexibility would make
it possible for these courts to meet the demands of rapidly changing social conditions
without the necessity of frequent constitutional amendment. The revision of Section
11 should give the legislature sufficient power to create such divisions as conditions
may require.
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(e) Physical equipment

The justice of the peace holds a court, and this implies a proper
place to hold
a court. While the present law requires the justice of the peace to maintain an office in his district, it makes no provision for furnishing the necessary quarters.
If the office is to be given its due importance, the justice must be provided with a
court room, properly equipped and properly maintained at public expense.
(f) Clerical and executive assistants

No court can function efficiently without a trained and competent clerk. This
should be an established and properly paid position. The clerk should probably be
appointed by the justice and should work under the justice's direction. The law
should also permit the employment of a stenographer if circumstances make it advisable.
The constable is presumed to be the executive arm of the justice of the peace.
With some modification and codification of the present law, the constable could be
transformed into an efficient executive officer.
(g) Status as a court

Justices of the peace, under Section 11 of the constitution, have been held to be
township, ward or borough officers. Nevertheless, he holds a court. It is not a court
of record, although he is required to keep a docket and must make some quite
complicated records of his transactions. His filled docket, when filed in the office of
the prothonotary, becomes a record open to the public.
There does not seem to be any substantial reason why the court of the justice
of the peace should not take its place in the hierarchy of courts, holding the same
status as to the field which it covers as does the court of common pleas in its field.
It should certainly be a court of record and, if it were provided with a qualified
clerk and adequate stenographic service, could be so effectively.
C. Conclusion.
These suggestions for the reform of the minor judiciary system are not new.
The defects of the system due to its antiquated character are generally recognized.
The lack of flexibility in the constitutional provisions, which do not give to the
legislature authority to make structural changes in the system as they are demanded
to meet rapidly changing social conditions, is clearly understood. It is generally
agreed that the justice of the peace should have an educational qualification; that
the term should be lengthened; that the district should be fixed on the basis of population; that the fee system should be abolished and be replaced by an adequate
salary; that the magistrate should be furnished with a proper court room, a clerk,
a stenographer and a more efficient executive officer; and that the court should be
made a court of record and its status should be clearly defined and its dignity increased. Present social conditions require all of these reforms and the demand for
them is becoming more and more insistent.
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Some of the objections to the present system were clearly understood by the
Commission on Constitutional Amendment and Revision of 1920. In its proposed
revision of Section 11, it recommends:
(a)
the court
(b)
(c)

Election of the justice of the peace by districts to be created by
of common pleas after each decennia census;
increase of required residence to two years;
payment by salary, fees to be paid into the county treasury.

These would have been steps in the right direction. These details, as well as
most of the other proposed provisions, are more properly matters to be left to the
legislature rather than embodied in the constitution. The debates of this commission show that, even at that date, the inadequacy of the present system was recognized.
These improvements need not wait upon a general revision of the constitution.
All of these suggestions can be put into effect by amendment of Article V, Section
11. The amended constitutional provisions should authorize the legislature to ordain and establish such inferior courts as may from time to time become advisable
and that such courts shall have such jurisdiction as may from time to time be prescribed by law. A brief provision to this effect could replace the present Section
11. Any attempt to prescribe the details of the organization of such courts in the
constitution destroys the flexibility of the provision. It makes the system rigid and
renders impossible the continuous adaptation of the system to the continually changing conditions. The constitution, as a framework of government, should place the
general power in the hands of the legislative authority. The various attempts to legislate through constitutional provisions can hardly be described as successful. This
is a power to modify the machinery of government; it does not directly affect substantive rights. In other words, the proposed extension of power relates only to
the organization of the minor judiciary system. After the adoption of the proposed
amendment, an act or acts creating a minor judiciary system could work out the suggested details. The system would then be subject to change, if change became necessary, by an amending act.
It has been suggested from time to time that the office of justice of the peace
be abolished and that it be replaced by an entirely new type of magistracy. It is notclear what could be gained by such action in Pennsylvania. The office is ancient and
it is deeply imbedded in Pennsylvania's legal system. Abolition of the office would
be to discard the results of centuries of experience. What is needed here is to remove
the obstructions and to modernize the machinery so that the system will have a
chance to work efficiently. The reforms proposed must conserve and rest upon the
results of past experience.
While present laws relating to the jurisdiction of the minor judiciary require
some clarification and the rules of procedure before these courts should be reduced
to a consistent code, the basis of the reform of the system is nevertheless the reform
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and modernization of the court of the justice of the peace. This foundation once
soundly established, the rest will follow in due course.
II

JURY TRIALS BEFORE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN CRIMINAL CASES

Criminal procedure before the minor judiciary in Pennsylvania is generally
admitted to be in need of revision. This procedure has grown up during a long
period of time and in a very irregular manner. Additions and alterations have been
made to meet some immediate need without much attention to how the changes
would affect the system as a whole. Many local acts relating to procedure before
the justice of the peace were passed in response to demands from a particular locality. As a result, the system is burdened with much irregular, obsolete and inconsistent matter of which it should somehow be relieved. Some obsolete local acts
could be repealed without disturbing the general form of procedure. Anything that
can be done in the way of repealing obsolete acts, or local acts, or acts which should
not be part of an orderly system of criminal procedure, would be a step toward simplification and clarification and will make later general revision easier. Such a repealing act would be sufficient to remove from the books the obsolete system of
procedure which permits trial of offenses and misdemeanors in a number of counties
before a justice of the peace and a jury of six. The basic act was known to old justices
of the peace as the "Erie County Act." To this unusual system, your attention is
invited.
In Erie County, Pennsylvania, before a justice of the peace in one of the townships, a complaint is made, by an aggrieved person, in which it is alleged that the
defendant did commit an assault upon the deponent and did then and there beat
and illtreat the deponent, in brief, a charge of assault and battery. The justice issues
his warrant and the defendant is brought before him. From this point on the case
may proceed in a number of different ways.
The complaint is then "fully read aloud in the hearing of the defendant or
party accused" and he is afforded an opportunity to plead. If he enters a plea of
guilty to the charge against him, the justice will proceed to inquire into the circumstances of the case, so far as he shall think best for a proper understanding of defendant's guilt, and then pass sentence upon the defendant. This sentence will be
of the same character and will have "the full force and effect of a sentence pronounced by the court of quarter sessions," and the defendant will be committed to
the county jail until the sentence is complied with. The case is now at an end.
Or, assuming the same facts, when the defendant is brought before the justice,
he may "plead not guilty to the offense charged and shall at the same time signify
his determination to be tried before a jury of six, before the said justice." In this
event, the justice will enter the plea and determination upon his docket and take bail
for the appearance of the defendant at the monthly session of the justice's court; or if
the defendant is unable to secure bail, the justice will commit him to jail to await
trial. The justice then issues a venire to the constable "commanding him to summon
six good and lawful men, citizens of said township, city or borough, having the
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qualifications of electors therein, who shall be in nowise of kin to either defendant
or complainant, nor in any manner interested." The jurors to be summoned are
chosen by the justice writing in a panel the names of eighteen persons, from which
panel defendant and complainant alternately strike names until each shall have
stricken six, leaving the required six jurors. The manner of trial in use in the court
of quarter sessions, the same rules as to the competency and credibility of witnesses, the same forms of oath, and the same control of the jury over costs, apply
in this trial just as they do in the court of quarter sessions. "The verdict of this jury
is final and conclusive upon all questions of fact involved therein." When the verdict is "guilty" the justice shall proceed to pass sentence upon the defendant according to law, and with the like effect as if the defendant had pleaded guilty or
had been convicted in the court of quarter sessions. The proceedings can be reviewed
on a writ of certiorari from the court of common pleas and from the judgment of
this court an appeal lies to the superior court.
A third situation may develop. The defendant may plead "not guilty" and there
rest. Under the statute, if he does not at the same time "signify his determination
to be tried before said justice, the justice shall proceed with said defendant as if this
act had not been passed." This means that the justice will hold his preliminary hearing and bind the defendant over or discharge him as the situation may require. In a
case charging assault and battery, compliance with the Act of 1919, P. L. 306,2
would, of course, be necessary. If defendant wishes to be tried before the justice and
a jury of six, he must signify his determination at the same time his plea is entered;
if he does not do it at that time, he cannot do so later.8 This discloses one of the
chief characteristics of this form of trial; it can be used only when the defendant
himself demands it.
Now, the foregoing outline of procedure will seem strange to any lawyer who
has not had occasion to examine it particularly. It is, in fact, a somewhat simplified
description of a system of criminal procedure found in the statutes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and remaining in full force and effect in a considerable
number of counties.
This form of criminal procedure was authorized by an act approved May 1,
1861, entitled "An Act to change the mode of criminal proceedings in Erie and
Union Counties." 4 This act provided "that the several justices of the peace of the
counties of Erie and Union be and they hereby are authorized to hold monthly
courts, with jurisdiction to hear and determine" the several offenses and misdemeanors described in certain specified sections of the Criminal Code of 1860.
The provision relating to monthly courts was later repealed but the provisions
of the act, with this modification, were extended by various supplementary acts to
the counties of Armstrong, Beaver, Bradford, Butler, Clarion, Crawford, Forest,
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 1925 - 1931 (1941).
3 Corn. v. Nelson, 79 D. & C. 65 (1952).

4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41,

§ 724 (1954).
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Lawrence, Lehigh, Luzerne, Mercer, Northampton, Northumberland, Perry, Pike,
Snyder, Venango, Warren, Washington, Wayne and Wyoming. The same system,
with some further modifications, became effective in Indiana, Potter, Tioga and
Susquehanna counties. The system created by the acts is still the law in the enumerated counties.
The offenses and misdemeanors described in the specified sections of the
Code of 1860, are blasphemy, disturbing public assemblies, public indecency,
cruelty to domestic animals, selling unwholesome food, divulging telephone and
telegraph conversations, assault and battery, larceny, fraud on boarding house keepers, malicious mischief to windows, doors, bells and signs. Charges of affray and
violations of the liquor laws in Bradford and Mercer counties were later brought
within the system. Repeal of the Code of 1860 and some amendments have introduced some uncertainty as to inclusion of some of the offenses. Jurisdiction in
charges of larceny was limitedto cases where the value of the goods stolen did not
exceed ten dollars. Complaints charging these offenses in the counties mentioned
above may still be disposed of before the justice of the peace under the terms of the
act.
Many details of trial and its results are contained in the act and its several
supplements and amendments. 5 The act, the numerous supplements and amendments and the cases growing out of this legislation, form an intricate and technical body of procedural law.
Let us look further at the first situation, that is, where the defendant enters
a plea of guilty. If the procedure provided by the local act were properly fitted into the ordinary system of procedure, it might serve a useful purpose by disposing
of many cases without permitting them to reach the court of quarter sessions. This
would be a matter for consideration upon a revision of the system of criminal procedure. The authority conferred upon the justice of the peace by the local act overlaps the jurisdiction over the particular offenses vested in the court of quarter sessions. The procedure also creates a neat trap in which to involve an unwary prosecutor or a justice of the peace who is not familiar with these local acts. Suppose a
complaint filed before a justice of the peace in one of the counties where the
local act is in effect, charging an offense described in one of the sections enumerated in the act. Suppose also that the defendant, guided by astute counsel, enters
a plea of guilty, and there rests. If the justice is familiar with the local act and understands this procedure, no question will arise; he will listen to evidence, sufficient
to enable him to determine.the degree of guilt, and then proceed to sentence the
defendant. This supposition, however, is somewhat unrealistic. This local procedure
has not been in use for many years; it may fairly be said to be obsolete. Few justices
of the peace have any knowledge of the fact that such a system exists, much less
a knowledge of its intricate details. Assuming this to be the case, that is, that the
5 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 392 to 397, and §§ 724 to 741 (1930); SADLER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 127 to 138 (2d ed. 1917); VALENTINE, SUBORDINATE COURT PRACTICE § 404 and §§ 436
to 445 (1934).
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justice does not know of this local law, he would then act under the general procedural law. He would ignore the plea, as a plea, since usually a plea in such cases
has no effect other than as an admission of guilt. A preliminary hearing would be
held and defendant, since he admits his guilt, will probably be bound over for
appearance in the court of quarter sessions. If the charge is assult and battery, he
will, of course, comply with the Act of 1919. Defendant may give bail for his appearance, or he may wait in jail. After the justice has filed his transcript and the
record is safely lodged in the court of quarter sessions, defendant's counsel, at some
stage of the proceedings in the court of quarter sessions, will move for the discharge
of his client for the reason that the court of quarter sessions does not have jurisdiction. Since the objection is to the jurisdiction of the court, it can presumably be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. On this objection it is difficult to see how the
court could do otherwise than grant the motion. The justice assumed jurisdiction;
the defendant complied with the act when he entered the plea of guilty; the only
course then open to the justice was to pass sentence after hearing enough testimony
to satisfy himself as to the degree of guilt. Thus, by -the somewhat anomalous procedure of pleading guilty to the charge against him and then awaiting the event,
the defendant has secured his discharge in the court of quarter sessions. What can
be done in these circumstances? This would be an interesting technical study.
The second situation, where the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty
and signified his determination to be tried by the justice and a jury of six, also
presents some interesting features. The supreme court held that the act is not in
violation of the constitution because the defendant need not be tried by this unusual
jury system unless he himself demands it; he will be tried in this way only when
he "signifies his determination" to be so tried. 6 The court makes it clear, however, that the jurisdiction of the justice rests, not on the defendant's consent, but
on the act of assembly. When he demands trial in this manner he waives the right
to have his case presented to a grand jury and passed upon by a jury of twelve. It
is also worthy of note that the legislature, in prescribing for these trials the same
formal procedure and the same rules of admissibility and competency of evidence
which are in effect in the court of quarter sessions, manifests a higher degree of confidence in the legal learning and capacity of the justice of the peace than do the
appellate courts when they repeat the well known legal fiction to the effect that
the justice of the peace is not presumed to be learned in the law but can perform
the duties of his office if he be gifted with a modicum of common sense. Since no
formal record is required either of the testimony or the conduct of the case, it is
not clear how erroneous admission of evidence, wrongful instructions to the jury
or other technical defects in the conduct of the trial are to be brought before the
court of common pleas on certiorari.
The acts are constitutional. While they have gradually passed out of use and
are neither generally known nor generally understood by justices of the peace of
6 Lavery v. Com. 101 Pa. 560 (1882).
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the present day, they are still the procedural law in the counties to which they apply. The fact that they are obsolete does not make them invalid. They now encumber the books, occupying many sections of the digests and many pages of text
books. This is a source of confusion and uncertainty. One of the purposes to be
aimed at in any effort to reform the system of criminal procedure is clarification
of the procedure; it will be a step in this direction to remove this obscure and obsolete system from the books. The acts should be specifically repealed. Before this
is done, however, each act should be checked with the court and bar in the county
affected to make certain that its repeal does not disturb some local situation which
may have grown up around the act. There should be only one system of procedure
dealing with these offenses. Where the statutes are obsolete, as seems to be the
case here, complete and outright repeal is the obvious remedy. The repeal of these
local laws would be a small but important contribution to the clarification and
simplification of our criminal procedure.

